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Wolfgang Ketter, Elena Kryzhnyaya, Steven Damer, Colin McMillen, Amrudin Agovic, John Collins, and Maria Gini. MinneTAC Sales Strategies for Supply Chain TAC. In Proc. of the Third Int'l Conf. on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent Systems, pp. 1372–1373, New York, July 2004.
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We describe two sales strategies used by our agent, MinneTAC, for the 2003 Supply Chain Management Trading Agent Competition (TAC SCM). Both strategies estimate, as the game progresses, the probability of receiving a customer order for different prices and compute for each the expected profit. Offers are made to maximize the expected profit. The main difference between the strategies is in the way the probability of receiving an order is updated, and in the way an offer price is calculated. The first strategy works well in high demand games, but not as well in low-demand games. The second was developed to improve performance in low-demand games. We empirically analyze the effect of the discount given by suppliers on orders received the first day of the game. We show that in high-demand games there is a strong correlation between the offers an agent receives from suppliers on the first day of the game and the agent's performance in the game.
@InProceedings{Ketter04aamas,
author = "Wolfgang Ketter and Elena Kryzhnyaya and Steven Damer
and Colin McMillen and Amrudin Agovic and John Collins
and Maria Gini",
title = "{MinneTAC} Sales Strategies for Supply Chain {TAC}",
booktitle = AAMAS04,
pages = {1372--1373},
year = "2004",
abstract = "We describe two sales strategies used by our agent,
MinneTAC, for the 2003 Supply Chain Management Trading Agent
Competition (TAC SCM). Both strategies estimate, as the game
progresses, the probability of receiving a customer order for
different prices and compute for each the expected profit. Offers
are made to maximize the expected profit. The main difference
between the strategies is in the way the probability of receiving an
order is updated, and in the way an offer price is calculated. The
first strategy works well in high demand games, but not as well in
low-demand games. The second was developed to improve performance
in low-demand games. We empirically analyze the effect of the
discount given by suppliers on orders received the first day of the
game. We show that in high-demand games there is a strong
correlation between the offers an agent receives from suppliers on
the first day of the game and the agent's performance in the game.",
address = {New York},
month = {July},
bib2html_pubtype = {Refereed Conference},
bib2html_rescat = {Trading Agents: Supply-Chain Management},
}
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